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Abstract 
 
The article presents a case study of the three labor Code reforms implemented in 
Portugal in the last decade. The analysis focuses on the politicization of the 
successive reforms of 2003, 2009 and 2012 and addresses the link between specific 
politicization and Europeanization mechanisms from different perspectives: decision-
making processes and agenda-setting, political cleavages and reforms coalitions. 
 
Beyond the content of public policies, the article also shows how different actors’ 
coalitions (governing political parties, trade-unions, peripheral actors) deal with 
national membership to the EU and how it affects political debates and social protest.  
If policies do not crucially differ from one partisan government to another, the 
economic crisis has considerably deepened the polarisation between both Portuguese 
trade unions (Confederação geral dos trabalhadores portugueses and União geral 
dos trabalhadores). If the former has been disadvantaged in the policy process it has 
nevertheless gained popular support as while as labor legislation is getting 
increasingly flexible. The policy cases under study plea for analysing social reforms 
in the light of European orientations, an angle that is underestimated in the welfare 
studies literature. 
The article reveals an increasingly politicization of the EU influence. In the 2000s 
(2003 and 2009), successive governments managed to avoid over-politicization of 
labor legislation reforms. To do so, they set -up academic experts groups to prevent 
early confrontation and negotiations with and between social partners. In the early 
2010s, the economic crisis and the new European pressure of the bailout negotiated 
with the troika crucially changed the decision-making process; experts groups were 
not set up, the right-wing government used the terms of the Memorandum to 
implement difficult social reforms. The politicization of the EU and its influence over 
national policies is getting more controversial, not among political parties, but among 
trade-unions.  
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Introduction  
 
From the beginning of European integration in the 1950s to the end of the 1990s, the 
influence of European institutions over the definition of social policy at the national 
level have remained weak. It is only in the 1990s that soft method of governance have 
been developed (Pierson and Leibfried 1995, Hantrais 1997) and strengthened in the 
2000s (De la Porte and Pochet 2002, Zeitlin, Pochet and Magnusson 2005, Zeitlin and 
Heidenreich 2009). The European sovereign debt crisis now calls for an analysis of 
the nature and the effects of European influence on the definition of national social 
policies and the construction of reforms’ coalitions in the context of financial 
assistance and the EU/IMF bailout. The Memorandum agreed in this context 
constitutes a new kind of external pressure over the member state. This evolving 
interaction between Portugal and European institutions calls for an evaluation of the 
effects of Europeanization in a public policy field that traditionally enjoys a great deal 
of national autonomy.  
The introduction of the article first posits the argument within the literature on 
Europeanization. Our approach takes Europeanization as an interaction and considers 
“the range of institutional, strategic and normative adjustments implied by European 
integration1” (Palier and Surel 2007, 39). The study hence analyzes the way national 
actors deal with the various types of European activities (Council Presidency, soft-
methods of governance, framing of EU objectives and policies) and their influence on 
Portuguese policies (the direction of public policies) and politics (decision-making 
processes, actors’ coalitions). The aim of the article is to define the role of European 
policies and politics in the reforms of the Portuguese labor Code of the last decade. 
To do so, it studies decision-making processes and agenda setting, political cleavages 
and reforms coalitions in the light of both their degree of politicization and European 
pressures. One of the main hypotheses is that the context of the economic crisis 
weakens conflicts between governing parties and radical parties. Pro-European parties 
                                            
1 Our traduction.  
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in opposition are more likely to cooperate and Eurosceptic parties are more likely to 
oppose governmental policies (De Giorgi, Mourry and Ruivo 2014). 
Europeanization and politicization 
Following S. Hutter and A. Kerscher, politicization can be analyzed in terms of three 
particular dimensions: the policy salience of the reforms, the number of actors 
involved in the debates and the degree of polarization among political parties (2014, 
270).  
The first dimension of politicization (policy salience in public debates) constitutes a 
condition of politicization. Non-debated and non-salient public problems are not 
likely to reach a strong degree of politicization (Hutter and Kerscher 2014, 270, 
Guinaudeau and Persico 2013).  
The second dimension (the number of actors involved in the public debates) indicates 
the degree of openness of the political process. The more different types of actors are 
involved in the debates and constraint the executive as potential veto players, the 
more the politicization of a problem is likely to be important. This article mainly 
focuses on political parties (governing and in opposition) and on trade-unions. Both 
collective actors are analyzed at their unit level but also in interaction to the political 
context in which they are embedded.  
Finally, the third dimension, the degree of polarization among political parties, is 
particularly important because it reveals the level of conflicts over reforms projects 
and in different public policy fields. The more controversial are the reforms’ projects, 
the more likely for political problems to be polarized. This last dimension, 
polarization, is particularly interesting in this paper. It opens the discussion on the 
logics of political controversies in a European context and in times of crisis.  
The article analyzes the links between Europeanization and politicization and aims at 
answering the following questions: does the strengthening of European pressures on 
national employment policies play a role in the process of politicization of these 
reforms? How do political and administrative actors handle these pressures and how 
do they use it? Under which conditions do these pressures constitute a resource or a 
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constraint for the various actors involved in the definition of employment and labor 
market policies? Finally, how do the peripheral actors of these reforms, such as trade-
unions, or more generally the citizens, react to the evolution of European pressures in 
this field?  
Several authors have shown that EU influence on national policies tends to be under-
estimated by political parties (Green-Pedersen 2012; Van Der Eijk and Franklin, 
2004). In the literature on welfare states and social policies reforms, EU influence is 
also poorly addressed. This article is interested in the increasing European influence 
on national policies and on political coalitions. Studying a European member state 
concerned with the EU/IMF bailout constitutes an extreme case. The article 
underlines the growing, but ambiguous, politicization of European influence on 
national policies. It confirms that the economic crisis is a major factor of 
politicization related to European integration (Kriesi and Grande 2012; Statham and 
Trenz 2012) and identifies the consequences of such politicization on governing 
coalitions as well as on left-wing coalitions. Finally, the article shows that, in the 
context of the bailout, the dissensus of European citizens identified by L. Hooghe and 
G. Marks (2008) is not that constraining anymore. The analysis of the labor Code 
reforms in the last decade shows that political leaders (even those opposed to the 
reforms) do not tend to underline this dissensus over European integration. 
Nonetheless, a major peripheral actor puts forward the opposition to the European 
project: the CGTP-IN, the major Portuguese trade-union, close from the Communist 
Party. The support/opposition to European integration thus creates a major difficulty 
for Portuguese social dialogue because it contributes to strengthen a (already high) 
polarization between the two trade-unions. Considering the importance influence of 
coalitions between social partners to explain social policy change, the hypothesis is 
that division and fragmentation of the social movement is likely to have an influence 
on trade-unions capacity to influence the content of employment legislation reform. 
The article shows that, not only both Portuguese trade-unions have a weak influence 
on the definition of the content of the reform, but also, that European integration 
constitutes an increasing cleavage that corresponds to classical divisions between the 
CGTP-IN and the UGT. However, from a public policy perspective, the growing 
social and public opposition to Europe remains, for the time being, a latent 
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phenomenon that is not really constraining for political leaders. In time of crisis, the 
constraining effects of European politicization on political elites and national 
decision-making processes identified by L. Hooghe and G. Marks (2008) must hence 
been nuanced.  
 
Process-tracing and frame analysis  
In order to understand the nature of European influence over Portuguese policies and 
politics and to analyze Europeanization and politicization, this article relies on a 
combination of qualitative methods. First, process-tracing analysis allows for 
identifying the different sequences of political decision during each reform of the 
labor Code. Second, frame analysis is used as a tool to evaluate how the various 
actors involved in the definition of the reforms try to legitimate their orientations. To 
feed both perspectives, the study relies on three main sources. The first type relies on 
semi-directive interviews2 (27 in Lisbon, 31 in Brussels3). These interviews with key-
actors of the reforms at the national level, but with the actors involved in European 
decisions in Brussels and/or at the national level, are useful to understand the logics of 
their actions as well as the structure of their interactions. The second source used in 
this study is the written sources produced by these actors; the parliamentary debates 
of each labor Code reform; and press articles written at that time. The analysis of such 
sources allows for tracing the evolution of the debates on labor legislation, for 
identifying the frames and the types of arguments mobilized by different actors as 
well as the most problematic stakes. Finally, the participative observation conducted 
within the General Secretariat of the European Commission (November-December 
2007), a few months after the Portuguese Presidency on the Council in the first 
semester 2007, have also contributed to my understanding of the various political 
activities of political and administrative actors within the Commission, and of the 
                                            
2  In order to guarantee the confidentiality of interviewees, the quotations in this article cannot 
be attributed to one particular actor. This choice may be frustrating for the reader but the 
institution to which the actor belongs nonetheless allows for putting their words and defended 
positions in context.  
3 29 other interviews were conducted in Paris, in the context of the comparative (France-
Portugal) PhD dissertation that has inspired this article (Caune, 2013). 
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resources they rely on. The constraints they try to overcome within the organization 
do not constitute the object of this article (see Caune 2014), the participative 
observation has nonetheless allowed for a better understanding of the interactions 
between political and administrative that evolve at the European and national levels. 
 
The article is organized as follows. The first part describes the political context during 
the definition of the first Portuguese labor Code (2003). If the polarization among 
governing parties remains weak, the successive governments nevertheless set-up 
experts’ commission in order to avoid early and over politicization of the debates with 
and between social partners. The second part stresses that the successive reform, in 
2009, was crucially influenced by Portuguese authorities’ commitment regarding their 
European responsibilities. In 2007, the Portuguese Council Presidency greatly favored 
a growing politicization at the left of the Portuguese political spectrum. Finally, the 
third part focuses on the crucial influence of the 2011 negotiations with the troika in 
the context bailout to explain the content of the 2012 labor Code reform. The 
Memorandum was negotiated in between the collapse of the socialist government 
when it failed to pass a fourth adjustment plan in March 2011 and the early legislative 
election in June 2011 that led to the return to power of a right-wing coalition. The 
Memorandum is a major source of political pressure, and the government used this 
constraint as a political resource to increase flexibility on the labor markets.  
* 
Radical left polarization: the example of the labor Code reform in 2003 
 
In the early 2000s, when Portugal engages in its second Council Presidency, the 
Portuguese labor legislation has not been deeply reformed since the fall of Salazar’s 
dictatorship in 1974. In 2000, the first reform of the labor Code is initiated by the 
socialist government led by António Guterres and is finally implemented in 2003 by 
the social-democrat (Partido social democrata – PSD) government led by José 
Manuel Barroso.  
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During the 2000 Council Presidency, the Portuguese socialist leaders were 
particularly committed to the development of European policy, particularly in the 
social and employment field. At the national level, the creation of the Commission for 
Analyzing and Systematizing Labor Legislation (Comissão de Análise e 
Sistematização da Legislação Laboral, CCL), one month before the end of the 
Portuguese Presidency of the Council, constitutes an illustration of the socialist 
government’s commitment to be in line with the objectives and the principles they 
were defending at the European level.  
At that period, Portuguese authorities also directly addressed European requirements 
in the context of the European Employment Strategy (EES). In such context, the 
Commission put specific pressure in the field of training policies (primary education 
and life-long learning). At the national level, political actors reached a rare consensus 
with the signature of the tripartite Agreement on employment, labor market, education 
and training4 in February 2001. The signature of the CGTP-IN must be highlighted. 
While the social agreements of the 1990s where general agreements orientated 
towards public revenue (fiscal and economic policy, Social Security), the 2001 
Agreement addresses employment relations at a medium scale. In Portugal, such 
agreement is the only type to have a chance to be agreed upon a wide range of social 
partners, or put in other words, the more likely to be accepted by the CGTP-IN 
(Casimiro Ferreira 2005, 83). 
However, the multidimensional changes involved in the definition of the first 
Portuguese labor Code raised fewer consensuses and politicization was not avoided 
even if the proponents of the reform implemented depoliticization strategies. In the 
following paragraphs, the article addresses the main stake of politicization during the 
process of this reform. 
 
Experts’ commission: a governmental strategy to avoid over-politicization 
                                            
4 Acordo sobre política de Emprego, Mercado de Trabalho, Educação e Formação. 
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The first Portuguese labor Code is largely inspired by the work of the experts’ 
commission set up by the socialist government in 2000 (during the Council 
Presidency and one year before the defeat of the socialist party at the legislative 
elections of March 2002). The dynamic created by the experts’ commission has 
largely participated in, if not the depoliticization of the debate over labor legislation, 
at least in the weakening of political conflicts.  
Composed by eleven jurists specialized in labor legislation, the CCL is chaired by 
António Monteiro Fernandes, professor of labor law at the Superior Institute of Work 
and Enterprise (Instituto Superior de Ciências do Trabalho e da Empresa, ISCTE) of 
the University Institute of Lisbon5. Between 1995 and 1997, he was Secretary of State 
for Work under the socialist government led by Antonio Guterres. Nonetheless, the 
CCL is also composed of members of the Universidade Clássica of Lisbon, closest 
from the center-right and the catholic movement6. The composition of the CCL 
illustrates the need, for the government, to remain capable of showing openness 
towards distinct perspectives. In the context of the difficult Portuguese social 
dialogue, the main stake of the reform process was to avoid an over-politicization of 
the debates so that it would be possible to go as far as possible in the systematization 
of the existing labor law. Mobilizing a team of academic experts was strategically 
used as a tool to depoliticize the debates from the initial stage of the reform7. The 
members of the CCL were selected in concertation with trade-unions organizations 
and governing political parties.  
The political objective was to prevent the debates to be initiated and early discussed 
in the Permanent Commission of social dialogue (Comissão Permanente de 
Concertação Social, CPCS) between social partners. The objective was clearly to 
                                            
5 An interviewee reminds the close links between the Socialist Party (Partido Socialista) and 
the ICSTE, a real breeding ground for academic experts mobilized by politicians, especially 
socialists.  
Interview P16. Researcher specialized in Portuguese industrial relations. Center of research 
and studies in sociology (Centro de investigação e estudos de sociologia) at the ICSTE. 
6 Interview P19. May, 31th, 2011. Member of the Commission of analyze and systematization 
on labor legislation (CCL). 
7 Interview P19. May, 31th, 2011. Member of the Commission of analyze and systematization 
on labor legislation (CCL).   
Interview P20. May, 30th, 2011. Member of the Commission of the White Book on labor 
relations (CLB). 
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exclude the CPCS from the reform’s initial framing. By calling for an initial framing 
by academic experts and well-known jurists, the socialist government framed the 
main objective of the reform as a needed rationalization of existing legislation that 
was contradictory. This objective was broadly consensual. Irrespective of their 
various positions, political leaders, bureaucrats, academic experts and social partners, 
did agree with the systematization objective8. 
The CCL was hence mandated to rewrite the Portuguese labor legislation, the so-
called “pacote laboral”. The decree that framed the functions of the commission 
framed the debate towards the most technical aspects. In October 2001, the CCL 
presented its first report to the government and social partners, a report that did not 
fundamentally changed the contents of the legislative norms (Cristóvam 2001).  
 
Weak polarization among governing parties 
After the legislative elections of March 2002, the return to power of the PSD with 
José Manuel Barroso as Prime Minister poorly influenced the definition of the new 
labor Code. As soon as it get back to power, the new government set up a new 
working-group that presents, on the basis of the work of the CCL, a pre-project of law 
(anteprojecto) to the new Minister of labor and social security, Bagão Felix, in July 
2002. The propositions included in the new project do not dramatically differ from the 
positions of the CCL, and invalidate the hypotheses often presented in the welfare 
state literature on the importance of partisan politics in the definition of social policies 
(Garrett 1998, Levy 2001, Ebbinghaus 2010). 
During fall 2002, the debates over the future labor Code importantly mobilized the 
radical left wing. At the Parliament, Communist deputees were radically opposed to 
governmental propositions concerning the new regime of collective agreements and 
                                            
8 For example: Interview P13. May, 24th, 2011. Professor in law, labor law, Universidade 
Nova de Lisboa ; Interview P19. May, 31th, 2011. Member of the Commission of analyze and 
systematisation on labor legislation (CCL).   
Interview P20. May, 30th, 2011. Member of the Commission of the White Book on labor 
relations (CLB). 
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caducity9. The Communist deputee Vicente Merendas sum-up previous positions of 
the same group: “the regime of caducity of collective agreement instituted by the 
labor Code affects workers fundamental rights and other important social and 
economic rights”10.  
The new regime of caducity also crystallized the opposition of some socialist 
deputees. For instance, for Luís Carito this proposition corresponds to “a civil 
conception of labor legislation with which [the socialists are] in deep 
disagreement”11. Left-wing members of the Assembly opposed the reform and called 
for the respect of international conventions, especially those agreed within the 
International Labor Organization on wages protection12 and unions’ rights13. The 
Portuguese Constitution constituted another political resource as it guarantees the 
banning of firing without a “just cause”14. Finally, analyzing parliamentary debates 
reveals that actors unfavorable to the reform mobilized different legislative or 
regulatory sources, not only national ones. If the Portuguese members of the 
Parliament usually did not put forward European requirements, European framing was 
nevertheless used in the national arena. European benchmarking or the Portuguese 
                                            
9 Until 2003, a law of 1969 established that collective agreement remained until it would be 
replaced another one. In 2003, the new labor Code allows employers’ organizations to 
denounce a collective agreement and to obtain a two-years delay after which the collective 
agreement becomes obsolete. Workers now can be protected by the labor Code instead of by 
the collective agreement. The new regime of caducity of collective agreement ends up the 
principle of maintaining collective agreements (sobrevigência). This principle was a 
guarantee to workers because it assured that negotiated right negotiated in the framework of 
collective agreements could not be weakened, even when they became obsolete; regulations 
could not weaken the legislative order, except if these latter were more favorable to workers’ 
rights.  
10 « O regime da caducidade das convenções colectivas de trabalho instituído pelo Código do 
Trabalho é aniquilador de direitos fundamentais dos trabalhadores, de importantes direitos 
económicos e sociais ». Source: IX legislatura, sessão legislativa n°9, diário n°112, 10 de 
abril de 2004. 
11 Intervention of Luís Carito. Socialist Party: « o reconhecimento dos mesmos direitos de 
personalidade ao trabalhador e ao empregador encerra uma concepção civilista do direito 
do trabalho, com a qual estamos em frontal desacordo ». Source : IX legislatura, sessão 
legislativa n°1, n.º do diário 110, 11 de Abril de 2003. 
12 See Odete Santos’s intervention, Communist Party. Source: Idem. 
13 See Custódia Fernandes’s intervention, Socialist Party. Source : IX legislatura, sessão 
legislativa n°1, n.º do diário 110, 11 de Abril de 2003. 
14 See Odete Santos, Communist Party. Source: IX legislatura, sessão legislativa n°1, n.º do 
diário 105, 27 de março de 2003. 
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“delay” vis-à-vis other member states, was used as an argument to legitimate policy 
changes. European institutions were not directly mobilized in the political debates.  
 
Left-wing politicization 
Employers representatives generally favor the proposition of law, even if the 
representatives of the Confederation of Trade and Services (Confederação do 
Comércio e Serviços de Portugal – CCP), of the Confederation of Portuguese 
Industry (Confederação da Indústria Portuguesa – CIP) and of the Association of 
Portuguese Entrepreneurs (Associação Empresarial de Portugal – AEP) regretted that 
the project was not enough orientated towards flexibility and would not solve what 
they considered the « taboos » of workers’ benefits agreed during the Carnation 
Revolution process in the mid 1970s (Cristóvam et Quintas 2002).  
Workers representatives were much less in favor of the project. Both trade-unions 
organizations, the General Confederation of Portuguese Workers, (Confederação 
geral dos trabalhadores portugueses, CGTP-IN), close from the Communist Party, 
and the General Workers Union (União geral de trabalhadores, UGT), close from the 
socialist and European social-democrats, traditionally have difficult relationships due 
to their opposed strategies in terms of occupying the political space. However, both 
organizations found common ground on two specific issues. First, they were both 
concerned with the changes of strikes regulations (for instance, the introduction of 
trade-unions compensations in case of illegal strikes). Second, they both opposed the 
new regime of caducity of collective employment contracts. Even if the UGT is 
traditionally more favorable to the negotiation with public authorities than the CGTP-
IN, it nevertheless joined the CGTP-IN in the common strike organized on January 
20th, 2003.  
During the decision-making process that introduced the first labor Code in 2003, 
politicization was also strengthened by a wide public debate among the Portuguese 
civil society. The League of Catholic Workers (Liga dos Operários Católicos) 
considered that the text would penalize the weakest workers, especially mothers 
(Cristóvam 2002c). Governmental propositions were largely discussed in the public 
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debate, especially by the Portuguese Catholic church that judged some disposition as 
“immoral” as they tend to introduce social instability at the heart of labor relations 
(Pernot 2005, 5). The involvement of such peripheral actors crucially increased the 
politicization of the debate. 
The parliamentary majority adopted the text in April 2003 in spite of important social 
opposition, from the left (the Communist Party, some Socialists at the Parliament, the 
unions) and from Catholic movements. The new labor Code strengthened firms’ 
internal flexibility and introduced new clauses aiming at favoring workers’ 
geographic and functional mobility. Flexibility also concerned the duration of the 
“normal working-time period» (periodo normal de trabalho)15. Firms’ external 
flexibility (i.e., their capacity in hiring and firing) was also developed. Yet, in the 
field of firing, the Portuguese Constitution – adopted in 1976 after a revolutionary 
period largely influenced by the Communist – has been particularly protective vis-à-
vis workers’ rights. Article 53 was set up to guarantee the right to “employment 
security” and to ban firing without “just cause”. This Constitutional deadlock had 
been at the heart of the political debate on the reform of labor legislation during the 
2000s. The reform of 2003 softened the principle of “just cause” and introduced new 
motives of firing. The use of short-term contracts was also facilitated16 and the 
duration of trial periods was extended. Finally, the introduction the new regime of 
caducity of collective negotiations was another important change.  
 
To conclude this first part on the analysis of labor Code politicization in 2003, it must 
be underlined that, despite governmental attempts to depoliticization (with the 
mobilization of academic expertise), the reform process was largely politicized (high 
policy salience, high number of actors involved in the process, and weak, but growing 
polarization between political parties, with poles divided between, on the one hand, 
                                            
15 The normal duration of weekly working-time can be extended to 4 hours a day maximum in 
the limit of 60 hours a week with a 7 days notice (instead of 2 hours a day with a limit of 50 
hours a week with a 14 days notice in the previous legislation).  
16 Their use was previously limited to three years, that could be renewed twice. In the new 
legislation, the use of short-term contracts is limited to six years and can be renewed three 
times. 
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governing parties - the PSD and the PS - and, on the other hand, the extreme left, 
accompanied by the CGTP-IN. Opposition also came from some Catholic movements 
opposed to the changing employment relations introduced in the labor Code. 
However, the influence of political coalitions in power (Socialist Party until 2002 and 
PSD from 2002) should not be overestimated. Despite the change of government in 
2002, the role and the mandate of the experts' commission and the content of the 
reform have not been dramatically transformed.  
 
The 2009 labor Code reform: European activities of national leaders as a source 
of politicization  
 
As they criticized the 2003 labor Code, socialist leaders promised the rewriting of the 
text in case of electoral victory (the law of 2003 was designed to be revised every four 
years). The “Code Bagão Felix” (from the name of the Minister of work under the 
former Barroso government) is a crucial issue in the 2005 legislative electoral 
campaign17. With this election, the Socialist Party won an historical victory (45,03% 
of the suffrage) and, for the first time since the fall of the dictatorship, disposed of an 
absolute majority of seats18. Despite a comfortable majority, the Socialist Party and 
the government led by José Sócrates did not hold its electoral promise. The Socialist 
Party came back to power with a fiscal consolidation program as the country 
exceeded the limit of 3% of deficit set in the Stability and Growth Pact. The socialist 
government rapidly set up a new experts’ commission, the Commission for the White 
Book on Employment Relations (Comissão do Livro Branco das relações laborais, 
CLB). The CLB is chaired by Professor António Monteiro Fernandes, who was also 
the Chair of the CCL in the early 2000s19. 
                                            
17 See: « Partido Socialista rejeita revogação do Código do Trabalho », Público, January, 11th, 
2005. 
18 With 58,92% of the votes, the left holds 143 seats (on 203).  
19 Besides the Chairman, two other members (ou of thirteen) were also part of the CCL set-up 
in 2000 by the former socialist government. 
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Political leaders initially framed the debate over the new reform of the labor Code as a 
necessity to overcome the gap between Portuguese and other member states’ 
performances. Reducing labor market rigidities was a crucial priority for the socialist 
Minister of work, José Vieira da Silva. In order to justify important reforms and 
increase flexibility on the labor markets, political leaders highly mobilized the 
argument according which Portugal has to catch up with European standards.  
In 2007, the debate over the reform of the labor Code was largely influenced by 
national leaders’ European activities. In the second semester of 2007, Portugal was in 
charge of the Presidency of the European Council. In that period, European 
employment policy is developed and “flexicurity” principles are widely debated by 
trade-unions representatives in Brussels (the European Trade-Unions Confederation). 
Due to the Portuguese Council Presidency, Portuguese trade-unions are particularly 
mobilized (especially the CGTP-IN). The European model of flexicurity proposes to 
combine flexibility on the labor markets and security for the workers20. It is strongly 
criticized by national trade-unions, especially in conservative-corporatist and 
Mediterranean countries, that is in countries with a very different social protection 
system from the flexicurity model. Trade-unions opposition to the flexicurity model 
was particularly harsh in Portugal. When Portuguese authorities organized a tripartite 
social summit at the beginning of the Council Presidency, the CGTP-IN strongly 
criticized both the government and employers’ representatives for their excessive 
interpretation of the agreement between European social partners over the flexicurity 
model and criticized the reforming coalition for being  “more papist than the Pope”21. 
Before the Summit, the CGTP-IN organized in Lisbon a demonstration to call for a 
more social Europe. The European model of flexicurity discussed in the context of the 
development of European employment policy also crystallized crucial tensions 
between the two Portuguese trade-unions, the CGTP-IN and the UGT. The UGT is 
clearly more favorable to the European project while the CGTP-IN is increasingly in 
line with the deception of citizens in times of economic crisis.  
                                            
20 See European Commission, 2007, Communication on common flexicurity principles 
(2007/0359final).  
21 Or, according to the Portuguese language, « mais papistas que o Papa ». Source : Balanço 
da Presidência Portuguesa e a Situação do País, December, 27th, 2007.  
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European activities of Portuguese political leaders had an influence on the reform 
process and on the political debates. Indeed, political leaders had to handle two-levels 
of political responsibility: the Presidency of the Council (and the debates on the 
European flexicurity model), and their opposition at the national level. 
When the Permanent Commission for Social Dialogue (Comissão Permanente de 
Concertação Social – CPCS) initiated the discussions over the White Book on 
Employment Relations in June 2007, the role of the EU in the definition of 
employment and labor market policies had been widely discussed. On the basis of the 
work produced by the CLB, and of negotiations in the CPCS, the government signed 
in 2008 a Tripartite Agreement with social partners (except the CGTP-IN) dedicated 
to the definition of a new regulatory system of employment relations, employment 
policies and social protection. In the field of internal flexibility, the socialist 
government softened its more radical stance on working-time organization. The 
government introduced an “hour bank” system (banco de horas), accompanied by the 
principle of “concentrated schedule” on specific days of the week. Even if the 
maximal duration of working-time was not increased, firms were allowed to extend 
the “normal period of work”. For collective employment contracts, the “normal period 
of work” could be increased until 12 hours a day as soon as the mean in two months 
does not exceed 50 hours a week. In the field of external flexibility, the agreement did 
not allow for an extension of the reasons that make firing possible22. The socialist 
government avoided a debate on the reform of the principle of “just cause” 
established in the Portuguese Constitution (a principle weakened by the previous 
reform in 2003), and agreed to abandon the measure according which “the incapacity 
of workers to adapt to new working conditions could be a motive for firing”. The 
agreement yet introduced changes to ease firing procedures and to reduce severance 
pay. For the majority of workers with long-term employment contracts the trial period 
was increased from three to six months.  
The CGTP-IN denounced the treason of the Socialist Party. It was especially critical 
of the changes introduced by the Socialist Party in the field of employment security, 
                                            
22 Maria da Paz Campos Lima, « Main Challenges to the Labor Code Revision in New 
Tripartite Agreement », European Industrial Relations Observatory, October, 14th, 2008. 
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workers’ rights and the guarantees of collective negotiations23. Under Sócrates 
government, the reform of the labor Code was one of the most applauded by right-
wing political actors.  
Whereas the text was supposed to come into force on January 1st, 2009, the 
Portuguese President asks the Constitutional Court to evaluate the effects of the 
changes regarding the extension of trial periods24. As the Constitutional Court 
considered that such a measure would infringe on the Portuguese Constitution, the 
article in the labor Code had been modified, and the text was finally approved at the 
Parliament. The new labor Code came into force on February 17th, 200925. 
To conclude this second part on the 2009 labor Code reform, it must be stressed that 
the 2009 labor Code reform was crucially influenced by Portuguese authorities’ 
commitment regarding their European responsibilities. The Portuguese Council 
Presidency greatly favored a growing politicization at the left of the Portuguese 
political spectrum. 
 
Politicization of European integration in times of crisis  
 
One year later, in May 2010, when the Greek government found an agreement with 
the troika and as the Irish, Spanish and Portuguese public debt were dramatically 
growing, austerity measures were rapidly introduced and justified as “a necessity to 
reassure the markets” (Magalhães, 2012, 312). Because of economic and political 
pressures, especially outside the country and from the European Union, the Socialist 
Party was forced to negotiate with the PSD, in opposition. But when the socialist 
government led by José Sócrates collapsed in March 2011 after the reject of its fourth 
                                            
23 Maria da Paz Campos Lima, « Massive Demonstration against Proposed Labor Reforms », 
European Industrial Relations Observatory, July, 3rd, 2008. 
24 The mobilization of the President followed a request of the CGTP-IN who considered that 
various measures proposed in the text would be unconstitutional, but the President only 
maintained a request concerning the measure devoted to the increasing of trial period.   
25 Maria da Paz Campos Lima, « New Labor Code Comes into Force in Wake of 
Controversy », European Industrial Relations Observatory, April 14th, 2009. 
 17 
economic adjustment plan and austerity program, the EU/IMF bailout was considered 
as inevitable and was negotiated during spring 2011 (i.e., between the collapse of the 
Socialist Party in March and the early legislative elections in June). For this reason, 
the PSD and other opposition parties such as the CDS-PP were also involved in the 
negotiations with the troika.   
When the PSD was elected in June 2011, the new government’s priority objective was 
to implement the Memorandum negotiated with the troika. The Memorandum offered 
a considerable window of opportunity for right-wing political leaders who wished to 
implement flexibility measures, reduce labor costs as well as the amount and duration 
of unemployment insurance. The difficult social measures agreed in the Memorandum 
were even more developed as the “cleaning” of the bailout was presented as a first 
priority objective. In such a political and economic context, politicization was 
particularly ambiguous and the EU was likely to generate political conflict.  
 
How the socialist government tried to avoid the bailout and however collapsed 
On March 23rd 2011, two years after the adoption of the last reform of the labor Code, 
the fall of the socialist government led by José Sócrates is a symptom of growing 
political conflicts among Portuguese parties after the adoption of three adjustments 
plans in one year. The first plan was adopted in March 2010 despite the abstention of 
the PSD. The two following plans were negotiated between the Socialist Party and the 
PSD as the leader of the PSD, Pedro Passos Coelho, finally accepted to participate in 
the negotiations instead of keeping a critical position that would prevent PSD’s 
political leaders to be considered as responsible for austerity measures (Magalhães, 
2012, 312). 
Despite Portuguese austerity measures and the three economic adjustment plans 
implemented by the socialist government, unemployment rates (12% in 2011), public 
debt (93% of the GDP in 2011), public deficits, interest rates and borrowing costs 
rose sharply. When they passed the threshold of 7%, bailout’s negotiations became 
imminent, as the government had declared a few weeks earlier (Magalhães, 2012, 
313). The Prime Minister José Sócrates proposed a fourth plan, directly negotiated 
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with the European Commission, in order to increase Portugal’s chances to avoid a 
formal agreement with the troika (Moury, Freire 2013, 45). The fourth austerity 
package was then considered as José Sócrates’s swan song (Gorjão 2012, 66). The 
Socialist government recognized that if the plan would not been accepted by the 
Parliament, it would make the Portuguese sovereign debt crisis impossible to govern 
and would lead to its resignation (Magalhães, 2012, 313). The PSD rejected the fourth 
austerity package in order to call for early legislative elections.  
 
Negotiating the bailout before early elections: a shield to avoid over-politicization? 
After the reject of the plan by the members of the Parliament, the President of the 
Republic Anibal Cavaco Silva dissolved the Republic Assembly. The EU/IMF bailout 
was negotiated between March 2011 (the fall of the socialist government) and June 
2011 (early legislative elections). Due to the collapse of the socialist government, the 
troika took negotiations with the PSD and the CDS seriously. Portuguese political 
actors recognize today that most measures were proposed by national negotiators 
(political leaders from the governing parties but also high civil-servants used to 
European activities) rather than imposed by the troika (Moury and Freire 2013, 46). 
Opposition parties had an important influence on the measures agreed with the troika. 
The reform of the Single Social Tax (taxa social única) initially was a key proposition 
of the PSD (Moury, Freire 2013, 46). Bilateral negotiations between the troika and the 
PSD have sometimes seriously constrained socialist leaders and weakened their 
capacity to resist EU/IMF political pressures. In the field of employment and labor 
market policies, the replacement of collective negotiations by negotiations with 
workers’ committee within the enterprise is another example of how the PSD’s policy 
preferences were included in the Memorandum (Moury, Freire 2013, 47). 
In May, Portuguese authorities agreed a three year, 78 billion euro, bailout with the 
EU and the IMF26 (modify in 201227). The financial package and the loan agreement 
required a budgetary adjustment and important cuts in public spending. It contained a 
                                            
26 Council Decision 2011/344/EU. 
27 COM/2012/0364 final. 
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project of reform of the national health system, of public administration organization 
and of the judiciary system. Privatization programs and reforms of the financial 
sector, the amelioration of the structure of banks’ financial capital were also defined. 
Measures aiming at increasing Portuguese competitivity and at sustaining economic 
growth also implied a reform of labor legislation. The Memorandum thus placed 
strong emphasis on employment and labor market policies. This new form of external 
pressure on the definition of employment policies in Portugal led to increasing 
politicization characterized by a left-wing polarization.   
In the field under study in this article, the Memorandum agreed on May 2011 set up 
different kinds of objectives related to unemployment insurance system, working-time 
organization, wages setting mechanisms, competitivity and active labor market 
policies28. The freeze of minimum wages, avoided in previous adjustment programs 
(including the fourth one negotiated with the European Commission) was finally 
imposed in the Memorandum as the EU and the IMF considered it was a key element 
of economic adjustment in Portugal29 (Moury, Freire 2013, 45).  
 
Polarization of parties’ positions regarding the EU/IMF influence 
As P. Magalhães reminds, two specific issues characterized the June 2011 electoral 
campaign (2012, 314). The first was the responsibility of Portugal’s financial situation 
that makes an external bailout necessary. The second issue concerned the types of 
policy measures needed to overcome the sovereign debt and economic crisis. The 
Socialist Party makes the PSD responsible for pushing the country in the harms of the 
IMF as right-wing leaders abstained on the fourth austerity package proposed by 
Sócrates government a few weeks earlier. By contrast, the PSD considered the 
electoral campaign as a test between the unsuccessful political measures implemented 
so far by the Socialist Party while the PSD instead favored the weakening of the state 
and of public regulations. The PSD hence engaged in the elections of June 2011 with 
                                            
28 Portugal: Memorandum of understanding on specific economic policy conditionality. May, 
3rd, 2011. 
29 Another condition relates to the pace of privatization that the troika wanted to reinforce 
while Portuguese leaders favored a delay influenced by the markets (Moury, Freire 2013, 46). 
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the objective of legitimizing a “new economic paradigm” (Magalhães, 2012, 315).  In 
the field under study, the PSD proposed to amend the principle of “just cause” 
guaranteed by the Portuguese Constitution, a measure that has remained an important 
stake since the first labor Code established in 2003.  
The election of June 2011 signed the clear defeat of the Socialist Party as it lost more 
than 8% of the votes since the last elections of 2009. The Socialist Party was at its 
weakest score since 1987 and the PSD won by more than 10 points. The Socialist 
Party’s strategy to make 2011 legislative elections a choice between neoliberalism 
and the defense of the welfare state was a complete failure, and the fact that the 
Memorandum with the troika was already signed when elections took place surely did 
not help.  
 
“More papist than the Pope”: the 2012 reform and the politicization of European 
pressures 
As soon as the PSD came back to power in June 2001, the new right-wing 
government led by Pedro Passos Coelho clearly stated that austerity measures would 
be even more rigorous than the ones required by the troika30. In the end of September 
2011, the government presented a project of law to the Permanent Commission of 
Social Dialogue (CPCS) in order to reform the labor Code as planned in the 
Memorandum. Contrasting depoliticizing strategies of expertise mobilization 
implemented by the successive governments during the reforms processes of the 
2000s, the terms of the Memorandum allowed for avoiding the setting-up of an 
experts’ commission. The direction of the reforms was already largely framed by the 
agreement between Portuguese authorities and the troika.  
At the CPCS, the main conflict between the government and social partners 
concerned the increase of the normal daily working-period of half an hour without 
financial compensation as both the UGT and the CGTP-IN were strongly opposed to 
such a change.  
                                            
30 « Une deuxième tranche du plan d'aide au Portugal débloquée », Le Monde, 12 août 2011. 
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After the announcement of the public budget for 2012, the UGT and the CGTP-IN 
jointly called for a general strike on November 24th, 2014. In fall 2012, when the 
Parliament initiated the debate over the reform of the labor Code, the context was a 
climate of difficult social dialogue. The government nevertheless managed to 
negotiate an Agreement on employment with the social partners (but not the CGTP-
IN). The Agreement signed on January, 18th, 2012 introduced important cuts in the 
spending of unemployment insurance and reduced the labor costs31. The text also 
increased flexibility in firing procedures and reduced dismissal compensation. 
External flexibility was also developed since employment contracts can now be 
suspended in times of crisis. Internal flexibility was also deepened as the hour bank 
system (banco de horas) was extended and can now be negotiated within the 
framework of individual employment contracts (until then, it was only possible 
through collective negotiations). The cost of overtime hours was largely reduced. 
Many measures favorable to the workers were suppressed (the right to compensatory 
rest following a certain amount of overtime hours, as well as four days of public 
holidays). 
Finally, the government step back on the most controversial measure, vigorously 
opposed by trade-unions, as the project of increasing the normal daily working-time 
period by half an hour without any financial compensation was abandoned. This 
political concession to trade-unions can be explained because the government needed 
to gain the support of the UGT whose withdrawal would seriously compromise the 
Agreement. The Agreement of January 2012 was finally transposed in a law, on June, 
18th, 2012. During the parliamentary debates, and although the support towards 
European integration has been difficult to handle in times of crisis, the Socialist Party 
stayed firm on its pro-European stand and did not abandoned this constitutive feature 
when the country was tied by the Memorandum of the troika, a Memorandum that the 
socialists deeply participated in negotiating and which had been implemented by the 
PSD. Due to its traditional support vis-à-vis European integration, it was politically 
                                            
31 The payment of overtime hours will be reduced by half. The instruments of collective 
regulations (Instrumentos de Regulamentação Colectiva de Trabalho, IRCT) that defines the 
highest costs of overtime will be suspend for two years and the right to compensation rest 
should be abandonned. See: « Dez regras do Código do Trabalho que vão mudar », 
Económico, 25 juin 2012. 
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difficult for the Socialist Party to vote against the transposition of the Agreement on 
employment in the Parliament. Yet, considering the harsh flexibility reforms, a vote in 
favor of the text was also difficult for the Party. The Socialist Party hence abstained 
on the text, which was nevertheless adopted by the governing coalition parties (PSD 
and CDS-PP).  
Portuguese citizens first welcomed with fatalism the implementation of the measures 
planned in the Memorandum as counterparts for the Portuguese bailout. After strong 
political involvement by the previous (socialist) government to avoid financial 
assistance from the EU and IMF, the bailout signed in May 2011 was considered as 
an option that could not be avoided. Since the beginning of this downward spiral, 
unemployment rates have not ceased to increase (8,9% in December 2008, 9,3% in 
January 2009, 13,6% in December 2011, 17,3% in December 2012, 15,4% in 
December 2013, and 17,6% in January 2013), even though since March 2013, 
unemployment rates started to decrease (15,7% in October 2013). Yet, youth 
unemployment have remained particularly high (35,4% in December 2013, French 
rates being at 23,4% and Germany at 7,8%).  
The slow decrease of public deficit has been disappointing but a greater source of 
satisfaction for the EU and the IMF concerns the shrinking of the current external 
account deficit (Moury Freire, 2013, 43). The troika repetitively claimed satisfaction 
regarding the implementation of structural reforms in Portugal. According to the 
troika, Portuguese authorities had been “exemplary” in their application of the 
Memorandum. At lease until September 2012, social strikes and public 
demonstrations had not been very important in Portugal. Most of the measures 
implemented by the government had been adopted despite the abstention of the 
Socialist Party. However, since September 2012, the Socialist Party and the UGT took 
a more opposite stand vis-à-vis the governmental parties and the implementation of 
the Memorandum. The Socialist Party voted against the budget of 2013, passed a 
motion of censure in the Parliament in March 2013 and the UGT joined the CGTP-IN 
for a general strike in June 2013.  
The growing polarization between the governing coalition and a left-wing pole 
composed by the Communists, the Greens, most of the Socialists but also trade-
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unions, including the rather negotiating UGT did not impede the Prime Minister to 
announce, in September 2012, a sharp increase in workers’ social security 
contributions on their monthly salaries (from 11% to 18%). A huge demonstration 
nevertheless forced the government to step back as more than a half million of people 
in the streets made it the most important social protest since the Carnation 
Revolution32. As importantly, public protest was then supported by the CDS-PP in 
coalition as well as from some members of the PSD, including the former Barroso 
government’s Finance Minister (2002-2004), Manuela Ferreira Leite. The PSD 
government had become increasingly unpopular and the resignation of Finance 
Minister, Vitor Gaspar, in July 2013, constituted a clear illustration of the growing 
conflicts within the governing coalition. Vitor Gaspar has indeed been a chief 
strategist behind Portugal's bailout and his resignation highlights the increasing 
unpopularity of the government's austerity measures. The government program has 
also suffered from the reject of the Portuguese Constitutional Court of some of the 
measures proposed in the welfare field.  
In 2013, the municipal elections confirmed the political difficulties of the PSD after 
two years of harsh austerity measures. The governing party (16,17% of the votes) lose 
almost a third of the municipalities while the Socialist Party won the largest number 
of municipal chambers in its history, several big cities, and did better (36,3%) than its 
previous best result in 2009. The 2014 European elections have confirmed the lead of 
the Socialist Party (31,5% of the votes) on the coalition formed by the PSD and CDS-
PP (27,7% of the votes). As the governing coalition has tried to capitalize on the 
bailout exit (two weeks before European elections), unpopular measures of the past 
few years have led to weak political results. Turnout is particularly important (65,5%) 
in a context of growing defiance vis-à-vis European integration.  
 
Conclusion 
Finally, the process tracing analysis of the three labor Code reforms in the last decade 
reveals that, in a context of difficult social dialogue in Portugal, especially between 
                                            
32 “Portugal finally stands up and protests”, The Guardian, September, 24th, 2012. 
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the two Portuguese trade-unions that have developed opposing strategies to occupy 
the political space, political leaders have mobilized academic expertise to avoid early-
as well as over-politicization of the reforms proposals. Two experts’ commissions 
were set-up in order to prepare the 2003 and the 2009 labor Code reforms. These 
experts’ commission had a strong impact on the content of the reforms (more than the 
governing political parties or the various political coalitions involved in the process), 
but these strategies of depoliticization were not completely successful. 
Depoliticization was indeed not complete and the left-wing pole is getting more 
radical. While the General Confederation of Portuguese Workers (Confederação 
geral dos trabalhadores portugueses, CGTP-IN) were opposed to the reforms 
projects, successive governments were nonetheless able to convince the General 
Workers Union (União geral de trabalhadores, UGT), close from blue-collars and 
from the parties of the governing majority. It constituted a decisive step to allow for 
the pursuit of the negotiations.  
The politicization of the three labor Code reforms studied in this paper was also 
closely influenced by evolving forms of European pressures. In 2000, as Portugal 
enjoys rather good economic results, European activities of national leaders 
(especially the definition of the Lisbon Strategy under the Portuguese Presidency of 
the Council) were used as political resources at the national level. Portuguese 
influence in the definition of European policies were mobilized in the political sphere 
as an argument to foster political change alongside European objectives. However, in 
2007, although the sovereign debt crisis was not yet at its peak, European activities of 
national leaders became more constraining. Indeed, at the European level, the model 
of flexicurity was discussed and debated by workers’ representatives. During the 
Portuguese Presidency of the Council in 2007, the CGTP-IN was at the frontline of 
social opposition to the flexicurity model. In this context, European activities 
constituted a constraint for Portuguese political leaders that have to assume two-levels 
responsibilities: vis-à-vis European partners and vis-à-vis their growing social 
opposition at home. In this respect, Europeanization processes have strongly 
influenced the politicization process.  
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Finally, the paper shows that, the new kind of European pressure of the Memorandum 
have completely changed the decision-making process, even in a policy field that 
previously enjoyed a wide range of national autonomy. The PSD in power has been 
fully committed to the implementation of the measures planned in the Memorandum. 
Bailout cleaning in May 2014 was used to legitimize difficult social reforms and to 
justify that the PSD would go even further than the measures agreed in the 
Memorandum. Considering the pro-European stance of the Socialist Party and the 
UGT, politicization of the 2012 labor Code reform was initially quite difficult as the 
Socialist Party and the UGT were politically committed to the implementation of the 
bailout. However, since September 2012, the support has eroded and the polarization 
of politicization with a left-wing pole has been growing. If the dissensus of 
Portuguese citizens towards European integration is not yet a radical constraint for 
political leaders in power, the politicization of European influence over national 
policies may become more difficult for them to handle.   
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